Moscow's proposal to Tehran still stands

For those of you who missed it, Russia and Iran are setting up a joint venture to build nuclear reactors. Of course Iran denied it, but as with all things this current government of Iran does, it was a lie.

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti commentator Pyotr Goncharov.) Statements by Tehran officials that Russia has made no "concrete" proposals on uranium enrichment are little more than subterfuge, and a rather uncouth at that. The other day the Russian Embassy in Tehran handed the Iranians an official note confirming that the earlier Russian proposal to Iran to set up a joint Russian-Iranian uranium enrichment venture in Russia remained in effect. It seems that here could be no more concrete wording.
The crux of the Russian proposal is that uranium should be enriched on Russian territory, instead of Iran's, as Tehran insists and the U.S. and EU categorically reject. And today this is perhaps the only possible compromise able to break the vicious circle of the Iranian-EU negotiating process (on the Iranian nuclear program).
Iran is insisting on the right to a full nuclear program on its soil. Moscow is offering a trade-in and aid. But Tehran, in the person of its official Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, says they have "never received any concrete or detailed proposal from Russia." But then he adds: "We will make close study of any plan or proposal that will officially recognize our right to enrich uranium on Iranian territory."
Now everything falls in place. A "concrete" proposal for Iran seems to be one that recognizes its right to enrich uranium on its soil. In other words, Tehran is taking the negotiating process back to the scenario patently unacceptable to the EU.
There is one fairly important aspect of all "concerns" regarding a nuclear program started from scratch (not only by Iran but any other country). Many states initially developed full nuclear fuel programs exclusively to acquire nuclear weapons, and did not immediately convert them to peaceful programs. Whatever the peaceful aims that were pursued by some or other state, this did not preclude a reverse process - re-engineering any very peaceful nuclear program back into a military one - thereby creating a full nuclear fuel program.
These concerns are heightened by the fact that development of a full nuclear program even by a state having advanced technologies involves what experts describe as "monstrous" expenses, while buying ready-made nuclear fuel is economically more profitable. Incidentally, Japan and Britain are not ashamed of using this second alternative, seeing no harm either to their nuclear sufficiency or their sovereignty.

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